Unofficial English Translation of the Judgment of the Court

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| Daniel c. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire | 2022 QCCA 1251 |
| COURT OF APPEAL |
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| CANADA |
| PROVINCE OF QUEBEC |
|  REGISTRY OF  | MONTREAL |
|  |
| Nos.: | 500-09-030045-223, 500-09-030080-220(750-17-003691-205) (500-17-113751-203) |
|  |  |
| DATE: | September 9, 2022 |
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| CORAM: | THE HONOURABLE | GUY GAGNON, J.A.PATRICK HEALY, J.A.FRÉDÉRIC BACHAND, J.A. |
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| No. 500-09-030045-223 (750-17-003691-205) |
| RAMZI DANIEL |
| APPELLANT – plaintiff |
| v. |
| VILLE DE MONT-SAINT-HILAIREWSP CANADA INC. **P. TALBOT INC.** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC |
| RESPONDENTS – defendants |
| and**REGISTRAR OF THE REGISTRATION DIVISION OF ROUVILLE** |
| IMPLEADED PARTY – impleaded party |
| No. 500-09-030080-220 (500-17-113751-203) |
| RAMZI DANIEL |
| APPLICANT – plaintiff |
| v. |
| VILLE DE MONT-SAINT-HILAIRE |
| RESPONDENT-impleaded party |
| and**TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DU QUÉBEC** |
| IMPLEADED PARTY – defendant |
| \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| JUDGMENT |

1. The Court has before it several applications in two files arising from a single dispute with multiple legal ramifications.
2. This dispute concerns land that belonged to Mr. Daniel before it was expropriated by Ville de Mont-St-Hilaire (Ville) in 2007. That gave rise to an administrative proceeding that has been before the Tribunal administrative du Québec (“TAQ”) for about 15 years, and three civil actions, two of which ended prematurely due to Mr. Daniel’s failure to set the case down for trial and judgment within the time limit set out in art. 173 C.C.P.[[1]](#footnote-1)

**File No. 500-09-030080-220**

1. In the first file – the administrative file – the Court must first hear Mr. Daniel’s application for leave to appeal[[2]](#footnote-2) after the expiry of the time limit[[3]](#footnote-3) from a judgment rendered from the bench by the Superior Court (the Honourable Gregory Moore), dismissing and declaring abusive his application for judicial review of a TAQ decision rendered in August 2020.[[4]](#footnote-4) That judgment dismissed an application for revocation of management decisions made earlier by the TAQ and an application to stay the expropriation procedure under way at the time. In its judgment, the Superior Court also condemned Mr. Daniel to pay the Ville the amount of $2,000 to reimburse the professional fees it had incurred.
2. The Court must also hear an application for a declaration of abuse and for damages brought by the Ville.[[5]](#footnote-5) It argues that Mr. Daniel’s appellate pleading is abusive and would like the Court to order him to reimburse the professional fees (disbursements included) it has incurred to contest it.
* ***Application for leave to appeal after the expiry of the time limit***
1. Mr. Daniel’s application is clearly late. The Superior Court judgment was rendered from the bench on December 3, 2021, and the appeal was filed on June 2, 2022, well beyond the 30-day time limit set out in the first paragraph of art. 360 C.C.P.
2. In addition, Mr. Daniel is unable to show that it was impossible in fact for him to act earlier, within the meaning of the second paragraph of art. 363 C.C.P. According to his own admission, he had a copy of the Superior Court judgment as early as January 21, 2022, and his arguments relating to his diligence between that date and June 2, 2022, are without merit. Even supposing that the lawyer he claims to have mandated is responsible for the fact that his appeal still had not been filed with the court office by late February 2022, it remains that the subsequent delay of over three months is due to his own lack of diligence.
3. This is enough to dismiss his application for leave to appeal after the expiry of the time limit.
* ***Application for a declaration of abuse and for damages***
1. The Ville is also right in arguing that Mr. Daniel’s application is an abuse of procedure.
2. On the merits, Mr. Daniel continues to contest the TAQ management decisions concerning issues that have for the most part become moot, yet presents no argument likely to raise any issues worthy of this Court’s attention.[[6]](#footnote-6)
3. As for the alleged breaches of procedural fairness during the hearing before the Superior Court, Mr. Daniel’s arguments are not serious. The judge was clearly right to refuse to grant the verbal application for recusation presented at the outset of the hearing, as it was based on nothing more than vague allegations that Mr. Daniel had consulted lawyers working in the firm where the judge practised before being appointed to the judiciary. In addition, the judge clearly did not violate the *audi alteram partem* rule by continuing the hearing without Mr. Daniel. Rather, the minutes of the hearing show that Mr. Daniel voluntarily chose to stop taking part in the hearing after the judge dismissed his request to suspend it and continue it at a later date. His arguments that it was impossible for him to take part in the hearing in the afternoon do not withstand scrutiny. In short, everything seems to indicate that Mr. Daniel’s purpose in appealing was to continue the abuse of procedure noted in first instance.[[7]](#footnote-7)
4. Because, ultimately, the Ville’s application for reimbursement of its professional fees is what is under appeal,[[8]](#footnote-8) the Court finds that the application is well founded in principle because the Ville incurred these costs as a result of the fault of Mr. Daniel, who abused the appellate process and is therefore civilly liable.[[9]](#footnote-9)
5. However, due to the summary nature of the evidence adduced in support of this claim, it is preferable to let the Superior Court determine the amount Mr. Daniel will have to pay. The Ville indicated at the appellate hearing that it was not opposed to the question being decided in this manner.

**File No. 500-09-030045-223**

1. The second file – the civil file – concerns an appeal that Mr. Daniel has brought against a judgment of the Superior Court, District of Saint-Hyacinthe (the Honourable Gary D.D. Morrison),[[10]](#footnote-10) which summarily dismissed his claims for being clearly late (proceedings akin to applications for judicial review) and prescribed (claims for compensatory and punitive damages totalling nearly $40,000,000).
2. The trial judge also noted that Mr. Daniel had acted abusively, in particular by exercising his right to sue in an excessive manner and doing so with the intent of causing prejudice to the respondents.
3. Furthermore, the judge declared Mr. Daniel to be a quarrelsome litigant and prohibited him from instituting before the Superior Court, the Court of Québec, or the TAQ – except with prior authorization of the Chief Justice or president of the tribunal in question – any proceeding (i) against a judge, administrative judge, or municipal officer, or (ii) relating to the 2007 expropriations or the immovables owned by Mr. Daniel and located in Mont-Saint-Hilaire.
4. It is appropriate to point out that, in justifying his conclusions on the declaration of quarrelsomeness – which were reached after an unimpeachable presentation of the applicable principles and a detailed analysis of the proceedings involving Mr. Daniel over many years – the judge emphasized the following elements in particular:
* Mr. Daniel has a tendency to attack, insult, and sue anyone who refuses to comply with his demands;
* He will not hesitate to accuse judges who reject his arguments of being corrupt and in league with his adversaries;
* He also will not hesitate to seek the recusation of judges on clearly unfounded grounds;
* He tries to control the judicial process through multiple abusive applications and by refusing to provide an email address and insisting that any communication from the court office or his adversaries be sent by regular mail;
* He consistently and unreservedly adopts unreasonable behaviour intended to delay and obstruct;
* He tries to implead Superior Court judges as co-defendants in some of his pleadings;
* He has even gone so far as to demand that his case not be heard by a Quebec judge and instead be entrusted to one not residing in Quebec;
* Over the years, he has essentially used the judicial process as a tool to exact vengeance on a plethora of protagonists he holds responsible for the 2007 expropriations.
1. Finally, the judge condemned Mr. Daniel to reimburse three of the respondents for their professional fees (disbursements included) incurred to defend themselves in the civil case.
* ***Applications to dismiss the appeal***
1. The Court will first hear the four applications in which each of the respondents seeks the summary dismissal of the appeal brought by Mr. Daniel.[[11]](#footnote-11) The respondents are of the view that this appeal was improperly initiated because Mr. Daniel failed to seek leave to appeal. They are also of the view that the appeal has no reasonable chance of success.
2. The respondents correctly argue that a judgment dismissing a judicial application because of its abusive nature may be appealed only with leave.[[12]](#footnote-12)
3. It is not clear, however, that this also applies to the portion of the judgment in first instance declaring Mr. Daniel to be a quarrelsome litigant because the prohibition against instituting proceedings against a judge, administrative judge or municipal officer is not limited to disputes arising from the 2007 expropriations.[[13]](#footnote-13)
4. In any event, it is not necessary to decide this issue,[[14]](#footnote-14) the Court being of the view that the judge’s findings that Mr. Daniel’s proceeding was clearly unfounded and abusive and that a declaration of quarrelsomeness was appropriate do not appear to have any weaknesses that might suggest that Mr. Daniel has a reasonable chance of proving that they are vitiated by one or more reviewable errors.[[15]](#footnote-15)
* ***The applications for a declaration of abuse, a declaration of quarrelsomeness, and damages***
1. The Court is also hearing two applications presented by the Ville and the respondent P. Talbot inc. for a declaration of abuse, a declaration of quarrelsomeness, and the reimbursement of their professional fees (disbursements included) incurred on appeal.[[16]](#footnote-16) To decide them properly, it is appropriate to begin the analysis with a brief outline of the appeals that Mr. Daniel has instituted over the last two years, on which the Ville and P. Talbot inc. have focused in their applications.
2. Mr. Daniel came before the Court on four other occasions during this period. The four appeals were from judgments rendered in the civil case, and a reading of the ledger reveals that he appealed from practically every interlocutory order rendered against him:
* The first appeal (No. 500-09-029211-208) questioned four orders dismissing multiple procedural applications (recusation of a Superior Court judge, revocation of an earlier judgment, application for disclosure of documents, application to suspend the administrative file);
* The second appeal (No. 500-09-029346-210) impugned mere management measures fixing hearing dates;
* The third appeal (No. 500-09-029443-215) concerned an order by the Chief Justice appointing Gary D.D. Morrison J. as the case management judge and, notably, Mr. Daniel identified three Superior Court judges who had previously been involved in the case as respondents in his application for leave to appeal;
* Finally, the fourth appeal (No. 500-09-700047-210) was from a judgment by Morrison J. dismissing an application for recusation and to postpone the hearing on the merits. Again, Mr. Daniel identified certain Superior Court judges as respondents in his application for leave to appeal.
1. None of Mr. Daniel’s applications for leave to appeal were granted.
2. In the first appeal, our colleague Bich J.A. found that the grounds of appeal were clearly unfounded, noting that Mr. Daniel was brought multiple pointless incidental applications and that there was no room for guerrilla warfare in the judicial system.[[17]](#footnote-17) Unhappy with this judgment, Mr. Daniel tried to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, but failed.[[18]](#footnote-18)
3. In the second appeal, our colleague Cournoyer J.A. found that Mr. Daniel’s appeal was completely illogical and contrary to the principle of proportionality, then repeated the remarks of Bich J.A. that Mr. Daniel should refrain from engaging in guerrilla warfare against the respondents.[[19]](#footnote-19) Here again, Mr. Daniel’s attempt to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada failed.[[20]](#footnote-20)
4. The other two appeals were also decided by judgments dismissing Mr. Daniel’s applications for leave to appeal and highlighting that the grounds he wished to raise were destined to fail.[[21]](#footnote-21)
5. The appeal from the administrative file discussed in the first part of this judgment, which, as was pointed out, constitutes abuse of procedure, can be added to this outline.
6. It should also be emphasized that, before the Court, Mr. Daniel continued to resort to several of the procedural tactics that Morrison J. relied on when declaring him a quarrelsome litigant. For example, Mr. Daniel refused to provide an email address and insisted that all communication from the court office or from the opposing parties be sent by regular mail. The members of the bench were able to observe first-hand the detrimental effect that his obstinacy has on the orderly conduct of proceedings in which he is involved. Mr. Daniel’s conduct was also frequently intended to delay and violated the applicable rules and the orders and directives from the Court and the court office. He also had no qualms about asking for certain judges of the Court to recuse themselves, raising frivolous grounds without ever complying with the procedure that applies in such a context.
7. In the circumstances, the Court has no hesitation in characterizing Mr. Daniel’s appeal from the judgment of Morrison J. as abusive. Viewed from the broader context of the dispute arising from the 2007 expropriations, it is apparent that this proceeding is nothing but another in the countless attempts by Mr. Daniel to use the judicial process not only excessively and unreasonably, but also to exact vengeance on the respondents and cause them prejudice. A declaration of abuse is clearly appropriate.
8. What of the applications for a declaration of quarrelsomeness?
9. In *Milette*,[[22]](#footnote-22) the Court cited with approval the following excerpt from a judgment by Clément Gascon J., then of the Superior Court, in which he discussed the most relevant indicia of quarrelsome conduct, relying in large part on an article written by our colleague Morissette J.A.:[[23]](#footnote-23)

[translation]

[82] These indicia can essentially be summed up as follows:

1. Quarrelsome litigants are opinionated and narcissistic;
2. They generally act as the plaintiff rather than the defendant;
3. They multiply vexatious proceedings, including ones against officers of the court. It is not uncommon for their proceedings and complaints to be directed against lawyers, court employees, or even judges, and to raise allegations of bias and ethics complaints;
4. They frequently reiterate the same questions in successive and ever-expanding proceedings, often seeking the same result despite the repeated failure of earlier pleadings;
5. The legal arguments set forth are marked by both their inventiveness and their incongruity. They are legal in form, certainly, but at the very limits of rationality;
6. The repeated failures of the proceedings they bring sooner or later result in their inability to pay the related expenses and legal costs;
7. Most if not all adverse judgments are appealed or are the subject of applications for judicial review or revocation;
8. They are self-represented;
9. Their pleadings are often riddled with insults and attacks.

[83] For its part, the Court wishes to extend this list with two more rather common traits in such matters:

(a) They seek disproportionate monetary condemnations in relation to the actual prejudice alleged, and they add atypical conclusions that have nothing to do with the actual issue in dispute;

(b) They are unable and refuse to respect the authority of the courts, to which, however, they claim the right to have access and to use.

[84] That said, not all these characteristics need be present to conclude that conduct is quarrelsome, excessive, and unreasonable. Each case must turn on its own facts. It is the overall analysis that counts.

1. Applying this analytical framework to the circumstances in which Mr. Daniel has addressed the Court over these past two years leads to the conclusion that he merits the designation of quarrelsome litigant. Acting alone and as a plaintiff, Mr. Daniel has been persistently obstinate and relentless, contesting practically every order rendered against him, and he has shown a similar attitude in his dealings with the court office. He has multiplied proceedings that were doomed to fail, and he has had no hesitation in directing some of them against judges. He tends not to comply with the applicable procedure or the authority of the courts, and he seeks to use the judicial process – including appeals – to wage ongoing guerilla warfare against the institutions he holds responsible for the injustice he feels he has suffered since 2007. Moreover, most of his appeals have concerned a case in which he claims amounts from the respondents that are entirely disproportionate to his alleged prejudice or even – with respect to the punitive damages – to the seriousness of the faults he alleges against the respondents. Ultimately, it may be assumed that Mr. Daniel’s repeated failures will sooner or later result in his inability to pay the legal costs and professional fees he has been condemned to pay.
2. In the circumstances, an order is justified to prohibit Mr. Daniel from filing any pleadings (including an application for leave to appeal and a notice of appeal) before the Court against the respondents, their representatives, and their lawyers, as well as the judges who have rendered judgments in this case, except with the prior written authorization of the Chief Justice or any other judge she may designate.
3. Last, the Court finds that the applications of the Ville and P. Talbot inc. for the reimbursement of the fees incurred in this appeal are well founded.[[24]](#footnote-24) As with the first appeal, it is preferable to refer the case back to the Superior Court to determine the precise amount that Mr. Daniel will have to pay. This is also how the Ville and P. Talbot inc. ask the Court to proceed in their applications.

**FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:**

*File No. 500-09-030080-220*

1. **DISMISSES** the application for leave to appeal after the expiry of the time limit presented by Mr. Ramzi Daniel;
2. **GRANTS** in part the application for a declaration of abuse and awards damages to Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire;
3. **DECLARES** that the application for leave to appeal after the expiry of the time limit presented by Mr. Ramzi Daniel is abusive;
4. **CONDEMNS** Mr. Ramzi Daniel to pay Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire an amount corresponding to its professional fees (disbursements included) reasonably incurred for this appeal and **REFERS** the case back to the Superior Court so that it may specify, after hearing evidence and debate, the amount that Mr. Ramzi Daniel will have to pay;
5. **THE WHOLE** with legal costs in favour of Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire;

*File No. 500-09-030045-223*

1. **GRANTS** the applications to dismiss the appeal presented by the respondents Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire, WSP Canada inc., P. Talbot inc., and the Attorney General of Quebec;
2. **DISMISSES** the appeal;
3. **GRANTS** the applications for a declaration of abuse, for a declaration of quarrelsomeness, and for damages by the respondents Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire and P. Talbot inc.;
4. **DECLARES** that the appeal brought by Mr. Ramzi Daniel is abusive;
5. **CONDEMNS** Mr. Ramzi Daniel to pay the respondents Ville de Mont‑Saint‑Hilaire and P. Talbot inc. an amount corresponding to their professional fees (disbursements included) reasonably incurred for this appeal and **REFERS** the case back to the Superior Court so that it may specify, after hearing evidence and debate, the amount that Mr. Ramzi Daniel will have to pay;
6. **DECLARES** that Mr. Ramzi Daniel is a litigant subject to authorization in any file, current or future, before the Court of Appeal that involves the respondents, their representatives, and their lawyers, as well as the judges who have rendered judgment in this case;
7. **PROHIBITS** Mr. Ramzi Daniel from filing any pleadings (including an application for leave to appeal and a notice of appeal) before the Court of Appeal of Quebec against the respondents, their representatives, and their lawyers, as well as the judges who have rendered judgment in this case, except with the prior written authorization of the Chief Justice or any other judge she designate;
8. **ORDERS** the office of the Court of Appeal to refuse to file and to return any proceeding instituted by Mr. Ramzi Daniel against the respondents, their representatives, and their lawyers, as well as the judges who have rendered judgment in this case, that was not first authorized by the Chief Justice or any judge she may designate for this purpose;
9. **ORDERS** Mr. Ramzi Daniel to provide his personal contact information on the pleadings filed with the Court of Appeal, including a valid email address, in accordance with the *Civil Practice Regulation* of this Court;
10. **THE WHOLE**, with legal costs.

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|  | \_(signed) with the express authorization of Gagnon J.A.\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_GUY GAGNON, J.A.\_\_\_\_\_(signed)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_PATRICK HEALY, J.A.\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(signed) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_FRÉDÉRIC BACHAND, J.A. |
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| Ramzi DanielRepresenting himself |
|  |
| Mtre Steve CadrinMtre Caroline CharronDHC AVOCATSMtre Jean-Pierre BaldassareBÉLANGER, SAUVÉFor Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire |
|  |
| Mtre Émilie St-PierreWOODSFor WSP Canada inc. |
| Mtre Jean-Pierre BoileauSYLVESTRE AVOCATS |
| For P. Talbot inc. |
|  |
| Mtre Stéphanie GaronBERNARD, ROY (JUSTICE-QUÉBEC)For the Attorney General of Quebec |
| Date of hearing: | August 29, 2022 |

1. His applications to be relieved of the failure to set down the case for trial and judgment within the time limit were dismissed: *Daniel c. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire*, 2017 QCCA 926. Leave to appeal to the SCC refused, No. 37749; *Daniel c. Ville de Mont Saint-Hilaire*, 2019 QCCS 4884. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Subparagraphs (3) and (5) of the second paragraph of art. 30 C.C.P. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Art. 363 C.C.P. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Mont-Saint-Hilaire (Ville) c. Ramzi Daniel*, 2020 CanLII 63695 (QC TAQ). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. This application is based on art. 51 C.C.P. *et seq*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Third paragraph of art. 30 C.C.P. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *Beauregard c. Boulanger (Succession de Boulanger)*, 2021 QCCA 728 at para. 31 ([translation] “where there is abuse, leave is required because it is important to prevent the abuse from continuing on appeal”). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Art. 54 C.C.P. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *2741-8854 Québec inc. c. Restaurant King Ouest inc*., 2018 QCCA 1807. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Daniel c. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire*, 2022 QCCS 1165. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. These applications are based on the first paragraph of art. 365 C.C.P. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Subparagraph (2) of the second paragraph of art 30 C.C.P. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. On this question, see in particular: *Émond c. Plante*, 2017 QCCA 831 (judge alone) at paras. 5–6; *Le Gris c. Saywell*, 2018 QCCA 1355 (judge alone) at para. 7; *Nwabue c. McGill University*, 2019 QCCA 744 at paras. 33–37; *Amzallag c. Ville de Sainte-Agathe-des-Monts*, 2020 QCCA 1214 (judge alone) at para. 10; *Procureur général du Québec c. Beaulieu*, 2021 QCCA 1305 at para. 52, note 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See *Mitchell c. Ville de Lévis*, 2019 QCCA 410 at para. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. It should be added that the Court must show deference toward a declaration of quarrelsome litigant made in first instance: *Droit de la famille — 083038*, 2008 QCCA 2274 at para. 23; *Fortin c. Ville de Lévis*, 2018 QCCA 255 at para. 8; *Milette c. R.*, 2018 QCCA 736 at para. 17; *P.E. c. G.V.*, 2021 QCCA 445 at para. 7; deference is also required in respect of a finding of abuse of procedure: *Piti c. Grégoire*, 2018 QCCA 1879 at para. 88; *Syndicat de la copropriété de l’Île Bellevue Phase I c. Propriétés Belcourt inc.*, 2021 QCCA 92 at para. 31; *Ouellet c. Ste-Marie*, 2022 QCCA 495 at para. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Arts. 51 *et seq*. C.C.P. and s. 13 of the *Civil Practice Regulation (Court of appeal)*, CQLR c. C-25.01, r. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Daniel c. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire*, 2021 QCCA 20 (judge alone) at para. 23. It should be noted that in 2015, our colleague Savard J.A., then a puisne judge, made a similar observation when analyzing Mr. Daniel’s conduct in the context of appeals from the first civil action he brought following the 2007 expropriations: *Daniel c. Québec (Procureure générale) (Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement, de la Faune et des Parcs)* 2015 QCCA 97 (judge alone) at para. 13 ([translation] “[c]learly … the objective of the appellant’s actions is to obstruct to delay the orderly conduct of the appeal”). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Ramzi Daniel v. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire, et al.*, 2022 CanLII 21666 (SCC). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Daniel c. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire*, 2021 QCCA 515 (judge alone). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Ramzi Daniel v. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire, et al.,* 2022 CanLII 21662 (SCC). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Daniel c. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire*, 2021 QCCA 627 (judge alone) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Milette c. R*., 2018 QCCA 736, leave for authorization to appeal to SCC refused, No. 37831 at para. 19. See also *L.A. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de Laval*, 2022 QCCA 979 at para. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. *Pogan c. Barreau duy Québec (FARPBQ)*, 2010 QCCS 1458, leave to appeal dismissed (2010 QCCA 621 and 2010 QCCA 1084). The article in question is: Yves-Marie Morissette, “Abus de droit, quérulence et parties non représentées”, (2003) 49 McGill L.J. 23, the most relevant excerpts being found on pages 30 and 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Art. 54 C.C.P.; *2741-8854 Québec inc. c. Restaurant King Ouest inc*., 2018 QCCA 1807. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)